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Chapter 11: Psychological models of pain 
 
This chapter describes the definition and understanding of pain, for which some 
neurophysiological background is provided; the predominant psychotherapeutic models, their 
integration and the evidence base; and a brief note on philosophical contribution to 
psychological model development. It introduces important models that are further developed 
in chapters within this section, and refers to several chapters in other sections that draw, 
implicitly or explicitly, on these psychological models.  
Definition of pain  
“An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue 
damage, or described in terms of such damage.” (IASP Task Force on Taxonomy 1994).  
This definition of pain is discussed in much more detail in chapter 33, but remains an 
important starting point for any consideration of the psychology of pain. It represented a 
significant advance on earlier definitions that referred primarily to sensation or perception 
(Auvray et al. 2010), and only to emotional components, if at all, as part of a response. Here 
emotion is identified as integral to the experience, as envisaged in the paradigm-changing 
gate control model of pain (Melzack and Wall 1965), described below in Neurophysiology 
of pain.  
A note accompanying the definition gave equal importance to sensory and emotional 
components; acknowledged the unreliable relationship between pain and tissue damage; and 
recognized pain experience in those who lack language, human and non-human. But 
cognitive, social, and behavioral dimensions are missing, despite evidence for them in 
various animals (Langford et al. 2010; Low 2013; Mogil 2015; Sneddon 2011); the primacy 
given to verbal report overshadows reliable behavioral signs (Williams 2002; 
Hadjistavropoulos et al. 2011); and pain in the absence of tissue damage or disease is 
assigned to undefined “psychological reasons”. The last statement reintroduces a 
psychosomatic model that is neither required nor helpful: known pain processes explain the 
generation and modulation of pain within the nervous system without lesion or pathology. 
Adding an undefined psychosomatic basis for pain reintroduces dualistic processes into an 
integrated understanding of pain. Patrick Wall (1994), one of the authors of the gate control theory, 
proposed in characteristically robust terms three reasons why pain cannot be satisfactorily explained 
by reference to observable pathology: 
  
“First, I find it unwise arrogance to believe that our present techniques of diagnosis 
are capable of detecting all relevant forms of peripheral pathology. Second, we are 
now beginning to realise ... that a peripheral event may trigger long lasting changes in 
the spinal cord and brain ... This means that overt peripheral pathology is capable of 
initiating a cascade of changes which may persist in the central nervous system long 
after peripheral pathology has disappeared. Third, we are now beginning to discover 
that sensory systems are not dedicated and hard wired but are normally held in a 
stable state by elaborate dynamic control mechanisms. The rules of the physiology of 
these control mechanisms allows them to be pushed outside their normal working 
range in which state they will oscillate or fire continuously.” (p. 4) 
Many pains, from mild and momentary to severe and prolonged, originate from an 
identifiable cause, often external. Pain is a warning of actual or impending injury, and after 
injury a constant or repeated reminder to take care of the injury. These processes are essential 
for survival, since they maximize chances of healing and recovery (Williams 2002, Williams 
20176, Walters 1994). Injuries that become infected or infested, broken bones which further 
disintegrate through continued use, repeated encounters with noxious plants or animals that 
are not remembered and avoided: all lower chances of survival. So it is reasonable to look for 
causes of injury when pain is felt. What is unreasonable is to deny pain when no such cause 
can be found, and yet such statements are ubiquitous in medical texts and teaching, design of 
medical services, and decisions made about patients and their treatment (Donaldson 2009). 
Psychiatry and psychology have speculatively filled the apparent gap in explanation with 
concepts such as “hysteria” or faulty pre-pain personality (Pilowsky and Spence 1975), now 
formulated as psychosomatic pain in clinical and empirical work, despite the dearth of theory 
or evidence (Williams and Johnson 2011; Crombez et al. 2009; Merskey 2009)(see chapter 
13). Both in medical and in commonsense or lay understanding of pain, people with pain but 
no corresponding physical signs may be suspected of imagining, exaggerating, or fabricating 
it, and of malingering or seeking benefits without being entitled through genuine illness or 
disability (Eccleston et al. 1997; Patients’ Association 2010; Williams 2002). 
Neurophysiology of pain: the basis for psychological models 
The gate control theory (Melzack and Wall 1965) proposed an integration at the first synapse 
in the dorsal horn of the spinal cord of fast and slow conducted input from peripheral nerve 
endings and input descending from the brain and representing central control over peripheral 
input: “The model suggests that psychological factors such as past experience, attention and 
  
emotion influence pain response and perception by acting on the gate control system” 
(Melzack and Wall 1965: p978). Initially, this control was conceptualized as inhibitory but 
the proliferation of pain research which resulted from their model found far more excitatory 
than inhibitory mechanisms. These mechanisms could not only amplify pain, but changes 
from the dorsal horn of the spinal cord onwards could produce afferent signals in the pain 
system from peripheral stimulation – such as light touch, or mild warmth - not normally 
associated with pain experience.  
Research inspired by the gate control model focused on the periphery and on processing at 
the spinal cord level, often using restrained animals with acute pain and evoked pain 
responses. It was challenging to translate to humans with chronic pain, manifest distress, and 
spontaneous behaviors. The development of brain imaging techniques allowed some insight 
into processing of pain in the brain, subject to the shortcomings of models available for 
interpretation (Tracey and Bushnell 2009). This established correlation between processing in 
particular networks and subjective pain rating (Coghill et al. 2003), and the prominence of 
emotional processing even of expected experimental stimuli in people with chronic pain 
(Baliki et al. 2006), In brief, the signature of pain in the brain (Tracey and Bushnell 2009) 
bore out the definition as a sensory and emotional experience, with impact on cognitive and 
emotional function even in non-human animals (Low 2013). 
It is useful to distinguish between the immediate pain experienced when tissue is damaged, 
and that prompts rapid escape, from the persistence of pain during healing. An evolutionary 
understanding is helpful but almost entirely neglected in the field of pain (Williams 2016). 
Evident even in invertebrates with a fairly simple nervous system (Walters 1994), 
nociception is generally unmodulated and the response is often reflexive. From that point, the 
inflammatory response and other systemic changes increase sensitivity of the area around the 
injury, prompting wound care and adjustments to movement (such as guarding or limping) 
and reduction of usual activities to minimize disturbance during healing (Walters 1994; 
Woolf 2010). The wounded animal – best described in mammals – conserves resources, 
losing interest in eating, exploration and pursuing social and sexual contact, while resting and 
sleeping more (Wall 1979; Williams 2016). In normal recovery, as healing proceeds and pain 
recedes, the individual becomes more active and loses the hypersensitivity and the changes to 
movement and activity that are also behavioral signs of pain. 
In chronic pain, by contrast, the behavioral changes persist, as does pain. The injury (such as 
from trauma or surgery), if any, has healed; there may be ongoing disease such as rheumatoid 
  
arthritis or endometriosis but the relationship of pain to pathology is very variable; or there 
may be neither injury nor pathology detected but the pain starts and continues without 
identifiable cause. One further possibility is neuropathic pain, when nerve tissue is damaged 
and multiple changes within the nervous system, peripheral, central, or both, generate pain on 
the slightest stimulus or spontaneously (Woolf 2010). It is chronic pain in particular that is 
often judged in medical or lay settings to lack a biological basis, and that has provided fertile 
ground for psychological models of pain .  
The psychological models described and discussed here are the behavioral model, the 
cognitive and combined cognitive-behavioral models, and third wave models (see also 
chapters 12 and 35). All are implicitly or explicitly compared with what is often referred to as 
the ‘medical model’, an oversimplified and concrete account of pain as described above, that 
recognises tissue damage or pathology as the basis of pain, and the complaint of pain in the 
absence of identifiable tissue damage as suspect: as discussed above, this fails to integrate the 
contribution of the brain to the experience of pain. 
The behavioral model 
The foundation of psychology in chronic pain lies in the operant behavioral model 
developed by Fordyce (1976; Main et al. 2014), drawing on clinical experience in one 
of the earliest multidisciplinary pain clinics. If there was no longer a peripheral driver 
of pain (on the basis of medical assessment), his model focused on behaviors that 
indicated pain, verbal and nonverbal, from limping, guarding, or sighing to taking 
analgesics, soliciting social support, and seeking medical help. Fordyce explicitly 
rejected assumptions of covert psychological motivation as the explanation for pain, 
and took a neutral and compassionate stance towards chronic pain patients. Rest, 
attention, medication, but also recognition of progress were commonly used 
reinforcers. 
Fordyce emphasized the distinction between “respondent pain”, where behavior was a 
response to onset or exacerbation of pain, often acute-on-chronic pain (that is, acute 
exacerbation of chronic pain), and “operant pain” where the timing and frequency of 
behavior in relation to its consequences appeared to confirm that those consequences 
controlled the behavior. A common example of respondent knee pain would be 
evidenced by limping when under particular strain; of operant knee pain, of limping 
only when sympathetic others were present. Pain behaviors were addressed because 
  
they were accessible (Fordyce et al. 1968), not through any presumption of cause. 
Fordyce was careful to engage with the wider context of the patient’s life, to share the 
model with the patient, and to involve the patient’s family members, workmates or 
employers in behavioral change. Alongside the reduction of pain behaviors, he 
stressed the importance of increasing well behaviors, again using operant methods, 
based on the patient’s choice of leisure and other activities. 
In experimental settings, where the pain has little or no threat value, and social relationships 
are constrained by design, it is possible to manipulate some pain-related behaviors, 
particularly verbal ones, by systematic positive or negative reinforcement: the model predicts 
behaviors well. In clinical settings many other variables apply and it is difficult to isolate or 
observe behavioral contingencies. Despite this, and the objections of Fordyce and colleagues 
(Fordyce et al. 1968), behavioral explanations were adopted into psychiatric practice and 
often subsumed into adverse moral judgements of patients. Rewarding behavioral 
consequences, such as attention, sympathy, and relief from unwanted duties were assumed to 
govern behavior, rather than observed, and were therefore reversed in order to change the 
behavior. While this is not a failure of the model itself, it was clear that contingencies alone 
could not adequately explain behavior in chronic pain, in clinical settings or in the patients’ 
own environments. Just as in the conceptualisation of anxiety in the broader field of 
psychology, behavioral theories gave way to cognitive theory. 
Cognitive and cognitive-behavioral models 
In contrast to the behavioral model, there is no original authoritative statement of principles 
or practice for the cognitive model, nor has one emerged with time. Cognitive models were 
(like behavioral models) extrapolated from mainstream psychology, but piecemeal and 
predominantly from treatment studies rather than from experimental study of normal 
behavior. Early models drew heavily on cognitive processes of attention control, and on 
treatment for stress (Turk et al. 1983); subsequently, information processing theories in 
mainstream psychology directed attention to beliefs and predictions (not least about 
behavioral choices and their consequences), and to the beliefs about pain and the ways of 
coping with which they were associated (Turk and Okifuji 2002).  
Other than by self-report, there was little access to cognitive processes in clinical settings: 
tests for implicit cognitive processes used in experimental settings were impractical. Studies 
of people with pain focused on a variety of cognitive processes by self-report: control and 
  
self-efficacy; coping (Turk et al. 1983; Keefe et al. 1992). In clinical settings, behavior such 
as avoiding use of a painful although functioning limb, or turning every conversation to the 
hopeless situation of having chronic pain, remained the target for clinical intervention, now 
indirectly by addressing cognitive content (such as beliefs about pain) and processes (such as 
pessimistic thinking about pain). Many treatment trials (Morley and Williams 2006) refer to a 
book by Turk and colleagues (1983) in which the cognitive-behavioral model is briefly 
summarized: 
“Behavioral change is a reflection of the intimate interrelationships among the 
patient's cognitive structures (schemata, beliefs), cognitive processes 
(automatic thoughts, internal dialogue, images), interpersonal behaviors, and 
resulting intrapersonal and interpersonal consequences” (p. 5).  
 
Above all, the individual’s interpretation of his or her situation and of the world around, and 
its implications for mood, particularly depression, underpinned the targeting in treatment of 
the beliefs of the person with pain. Some even used cognitive concepts to explain all 
behavioral phenomena (Ciccone and Grzesiak 1984). In clinical settings, the language of 
“distorted” cognitions, “excessive” disability was widely used, as if correct adjustment to 
pain could be specified and shaped by changing patients’ beliefs. This was not borne out by 
cognitive interventions (Turner and Jensen 1993), or by experimental tests of cognitive 
strategies such as distraction and use of imagery (Fernandez and Turk 1989), both of which 
bodies of work showed at best weak effects, despite patients’ accounts of frequent use of the 
strategies. The use of the term ‘coping’ for the strategies people used to try to sustain a 
reasonable lifestyle despite pain was generally unhelpful. The notion that strategies could in 
themselves be adaptive or maladaptive without reference to context was widespread, 
although some asked questions such as “Coping with what?” (Keefe et al. 1992).  
 
A highly influential model that arose from the integration of cognitive and behavioral models 
was the “fear-avoidance” cycle of Vlaeyen and colleagues (1995; Vlaeyen and Linton 2000), 
most recently critically reformulated (Crombez et al. 2012) in the light of evidence and 
theory. The original version remains the foundation of psychological understanding of pain in 
pain medicine. It postulated that the individual in pain either had little fear and therefore 
confronted the pain and found that it did not prevent activity, nor did activity worsen the pain 
  
or the original injury (if any), or s/he was fearful, with catastrophic interpretation of pain as 
implying serious damage or disease, therefore rested and avoided activity, so becoming more 
disabled by disuse and depression. These in turn produced more pain with less and less 
activity. Despite its testability, very few attempts were made to challenge or to assemble 
evidence for the model; its strength lay in its roots in established work on phobia and in its 
apparent fit with patients seen in the clinic. It was rapidly adopted as an explanatory 
framework, and disuse and depression, in particular, became targets of treatment in their own 
right, as did catastrophic thinking (appraising everything pain-related in a very negative 
way), consistent with cognitive targets of therapy.  
 
As with the cognitive component of pain, there is no coherent theory of emotion, and much 
work originates in pragmatic clinical settings. While Vlaeyen’s model focused on fear, often 
used as if synonymous with anxiety or catastrophizing despite some important differences, 
people with chronic pain often seemed depressed, although because of the prevalence of 
theories of psychogenic pain they were not always willing to discuss it with doctors 
(Eccleston et al. 1997; see chapter 13). Standard diagnostic criteria and questionnaires risked 
overestimating depression by attributing physical symptoms, such as sleep disturbance, to 
mood alone (Pincus and Williams 1999). At the same time, pessimism and hopelessness in 
patients undermined attempts to treat them, so important to identify. Importing pathological 
constructs such as phobia and major depression from mainstream mental health has, in 
general, been unhelpful, and efforts to build a normal psychology of pain are welcomed 
(Eccleston 2011).  
The third wave 
The “third wave” is a collective term for diverse treatments arising from what is claimed as a 
common philosophy, but is hard to represent as such other than their recognition as suffering 
as part of life rather than something that can be avoided or vanquished. The treatments may 
be provided together or separately. The most prominent in the field of pain and based far 
more in clinical settings and directed towards treatment, rather than in experimental settings 
exploring the nature of pain psychology, are Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT: 
Hayes 2004) and Mindfulness (McCracken and Vowles 2014). The roots of ACT are in 
behavioral theory of language, recognizing the shortcomings of attempting to teach the 
“right” cognitive strategies and coping approaches (McCracken 2009), and building on some 
  
elements of cognitive behavioral therapy while rejecting others, particularly implicit and 
explicit tenets of cognitive therapy that involve controlling thought content. In particular, 
unwelcome thoughts are accepted as thoughts, and recognised as possibly mistaken and 
therefore to be observed but not necessarily followed. The extent of difference from cognitive 
and behavioral therapy is disputed (Hofmann and Asmundson 2008). There is a focus on 
accepting pain (rather than trying to avoid it or fight it), disengaging and disinvesting in 
thoughts and emotions associated with pain, and acting according to personal values 
(McCracken 2009), the individual discovering for him or herself what works best. This may 
seem to require a wise homunculus who controls actions and responses, but this is rarely 
addressed. It is also an individualist philosophy, a contrast to some Eastern philosophies to 
which it refers. Although acceptance of pain emerged as a heuristic construct (Eccleston and 
McCracken 2003) that was relatively easy to share with patients and those around them 
(although sometimes mistaken for defeated resignation in the face of pain), current theory 
emphasizes psychological flexibility rather than acceptance (McCracken and Morley 2014). 
Unfortunately, psychological flexibility, defined as the capacity to persist in or change 
behavior in relation to thoughts and feelings, in relation to the situation, and in relation to 
personal goals and values (McCracken and Morley 2014), has so far resisted quantification, 
and its component parts are assessed by rather transparent self-report.  
 
Mindfulness was first used in chronic pain in the 1980s (Kabat-Zinn 1982) but not again (in 
the research literature) until it was well-established in mainstream psychology (Teasdale et al. 
2002). Contributions to its development have come from academic settings, including 
neuroscience (Zeidan et al. 2012), and from Buddhist philosophy and practice (Burch and 
Penman 2013; Carson et al. 2005). Mindfulness emphasizes being in the present, rather than 
in regrets over the past or anxieties about the future, and fully in the present, encompassing 
awareness using all senses and recognizing the many experiences other than pain. Daily 
meditation is for some practitioners an essential element to cultivate mindfulness, and it is 
encouraged in patients in mindfulness-based treatments for pain (Burch and Penman 2013).  
 
Problems with evidence 
Much of the presumed support for each of the models above consists of reports of efficacy of 
the practice in clinical settings in improving pain, mood, and disability. However, meta-
  
analyses of cognitive behavioral and behavioral therapy have yielded successively smaller 
effects with each update (Williams et al. 2012; Morley et al. 2013), while early meta-analyses 
of ACT trials look promising (Veehof et al. 2011). The apparently diminishing effects occur 
for a complex combination of reasons, many methodological but some related to healthcare 
systems in which trials are run. More and bigger compound trials are unlikely to provide a 
definitive estimate of efficacy (Morley et al. 2013), nor is treatment efficacy a demonstration 
that treatment outcome is attributable to the specific techniques of treatment rather than to the 
nonspecific effects of contact with therapeutic services and personnel (Wampold 2005). 
Assertions that one treatment type might suit one kind of patient better than another, and that 
each will be the best for someone, may be wishful thinking and have no theoretical basis. 
Attempts to type patients at entry to treatment have been superficial and unlikely to succeed 
(Morley and Williams 2006). On the other hand, trials of single methods of treatment with 
selected patients, such as behavioral exposure to feared activities (Vlaeyen et al. 2012), or 
mindfulness methods for modulation of pain (Zeidan et al. 2012) show impressive results of a 
clinically relevant magnitude, and suggest that we are not realizing the potential of 
psychological methods. The field seems to be in stasis, with diverse research groups pursuing 
patient selection, treatment refinement, or treatment delivery.  
 
Even if we were to design a more potent intervention, difficulties remain in conceptualization 
and measurement of outcome. Constructs which were reasonably well-founded in the field of 
psychological disorders are adopted and adapted in pain, particularly in clinical settings, in 
ways which do disservice to the theories and to patients: the reformulation of some 
behavioral methods to incorporate moral values, as described above, is a strong example. 
Further, psychologists’ weakness for believing that any quality or experience can be 
measured by self-report on a questionnaire that presumes a simple linear measurable 
underlying construct, by no means true (Michell 2009), made for a proliferation of measures 
which, whatever their claimed domain, often overlapped considerably in content and 
produced unsurprising correlations interpreted as association of the two domains, such as 
(lack of) confidence in activity and disability. There is little evidence that people can 
accurately report their thinking or emotional processes, or their behavior, and yet the 
assumption underpins most clinical (Morley and Williams 2006) and many experimental 
studies. Any face-to-face assessment, such as of pain, is a social event (Schiavenato and 
Craig 2010), not a ‘read-out’ of a stable internal state. Self-report is a behavior, and like any 
  
behavior, may serve a function, consciously or not, for the individual in pain in that particular 
context (Williams 2002): self-presentation as needy, or brave, or deserving of some specific 
consideration or exception. 
 
While the neuroscience and experimental psychology fields have contributed substantially to 
our understanding (Bushnell et al. 2013; Legrain et al. 2009), much human research is 
essentially trivial, involving pain inflicted briefly and unthreateningly on healthy and willing 
participants, volunteer or paid. This usually has little to tell us about clinical pain that is 
threatening, unpredictable, unwanted and unrewarded (Eccleston and Crombez 1999; Moore 
et al. 2013; Wiech et al. 2010). Research on people with problematic pain produces far more 
complex and less newsworthy results than, for instance, an assertion such as that social 
rejection and physical pain (both minor and in healthy volunteers) are essentially similar 
(Eisenberger et al. 2003). At first the area lacked any theory, but coherent frameworks have 
been built around findings, in this case using evolutionary understanding (Chester et al. 2012) 
in which all emotions trace their roots to pain (Walters 1994), and a neural systems model 
(chapter 15). Nevertheless, Iannetti et al. (2013) demonstrated serious weaknesses in the 
thesis: problems of logical error (reverse inference) and loose interpretation of neuroimaging 
evidence.  
 
Philosophical observations on pain 
Philosophical and religious understandings of pain are represented in clinical discourses and 
practices. Dualism has dogged the study and understanding of pain, and persists in language, 
concepts, and the therapeutic options and their delivery to people with pain (Kleinman et al. 
(1992, p. 10). 
Philosophical discussions of pain often invoke evidence on whether non-human animals feel 
pain (Dawkins 2015; Rose 2002; chapter 16), or whether humans feel pain without full 
consciousness. It is important to note that pain is evident in behavior and brain processing of 
unconscious patients (Arif-Rahu and Grap 2010; Schnakers et al. 2012), and that arguments 
about the completeness and functioning of the nervous system were used to deny – and so fail 
to treat - pain in infants and in people with cognitive impairment (such as dementia), despite 
behavioral evidence to the contrary (Hadjistavropoulos et al. 2011; Fitzgerald and McIntosh 
1989; Rodkey and Pillai Riddell 2013) (see chapter 18). Craig (1997) argues persuasively 
  
that pain has been poorly understood in many writings on consciousness, and concepts of 
consciousness misleadingly used in pain studies.  
 
Conclusions 
Despite the predominance of clinical concerns in driving research on pain, treatment failure is 
common, and availability of psychological methods alone or integrated with other treatment 
fall so far short of need (Breivik et al. 2006; Von Korff 2013) that there is no possibility of 
adequate provision for all those whose lives are affected by chronic pain. Understanding of 
pain needs to change in both lay and health care fields. Psychology of pain has largely 
developed without adequate reference to somatic experience (Eccleston 2016), to biological 
underpinnings, or to the social nature of humans, and has sought solutions before defining the 
problems. There is not yet any truly integrated bio-psycho-social model: most which claim 
that title are predominantly psychological. Arguably, to integrate with the biological and the 
social, psychology needs to adopt a framework, such as that provided by evolutionary theory, 
that relates behaviors common in pain across animals to its original functions, and to possible 
mismatches of those functions with the current environment (Williams 2016).     
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